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THE NO SURPRISES ACT DOES NOT SOLVE
AIR AMBULANCE COST, COST-SHIFTING,
AND SUPPLY PROBLEMS: A CODA
Melissa Ballengee Alexander*
After Rural Health Inequity and the Air Ambulance Abyss had been sent to
the formatter, Congress passed the No Surprises Act (the “Act”), legislation that
seeks to protect consumers from balance billing stemming from surprise medical
bills, including air ambulances.1 The Act requires health insurance to cover outof-network emergency services such as air ambulance as if they were in network,
limiting patient liability to in-network cost-sharing amounts and prohibiting
balance billing.2 It also establishes an independent dispute resolution process for
determining the out-of-network reimbursement rate if an insurer and provider
cannot agree, and it imposes new reporting and disclosure requirements.3 Once
effective, this new law should help resolve the balance billing and narrow network
problems identified in Rural Health Inequity.4
The No Surprises Act is a compromise solution, however, that leaves
significant underlying structural problems in the air ambulance market. The
Act does not address the cost, cost-shifting, and supply challenges plaguing air
ambulances. Section VI of Rural Health Inequity discusses why laws that prohibit
balance billing, require disclosures, and establish a procedural mechanism for
independent dispute resolution fail to remedy these issues. This coda does not

* Copyright © 2021 Melissa Ballengee Alexander.
1
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, §§ 101–118, 134 Stat.
1182 (2020) [hereinafter No Surprises Act].
2

Id. at § 105.

Id. at § 103 (determination of out-of-network rates; independent dispute resolution
process); Id. at § 106 (air ambulance reporting requirements); Id. at § 109 (Health and Human
Services and Government Accountability Office reports on the effects of the Act).
3

The No Surprises Act takes effect for insurance policy year or plan beginning January 1,
2022 or later. Id.
4
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repeat those arguments but instead provides three reasons the No Surprises Act
specifically does not address several pressing air ambulance problems.
First, the No Surprises Act does not establish a benchmark payment standard
for out-of-network rates or otherwise provide a mechanism to correct current
market price distortion.5 Worse, it actually prohibits arbitrators from considering
a prominent benchmark payment standard, the Medicare reimbursement rate,
making it virtually certain that excess cost and cost-shifting will continue.6 The
Act instructs arbitrators to consider enumerated factors like median in-network
rate, quality of provider, patient acuity, and population density of the location
pick-up.7 These factors would be appropriate in a well-functioning market, but
they ignore existing market failure. Reliance on median in-network rates will only
calcify current excess rates.8 The Act does at least bar arbitrators from considering
provider’s billed charges, which tend to inflate costs further.9 Nonetheless, the
new federal law leaves artificially high air ambulance rates largely unchecked.
Without federal action reigning in excess rates or exempting states from Airline
Deregulation Act preemption, consumers will continue to bear the burden of an
inefficient market, with rural Americans suffering disproportionately.10
Second, the No Surprises Act neither regulates supply nor frees states to do
so. Given how excess supply dramatically increases air ambulance cost, ensuring
access while containing cost likely requires government coordination.11 Yet, the
Act neither coordinates supply nor allows states to do so. This also virtually
ensures inflated air ambulance cost will continue.

5
See Erin Fuse Brown et al., Out-of-Network Air Ambulance Bills: Prevalence, Magnitude, and
Policy Solutions, 98 Milbank Q. 747, 769 (2020) (arguing government must benchmark out-ofnetwork reimbursement rates to Medicare rates or rely on competitive bidding to reach an efficient
market rate for air ambulance).
6

No Surprises Act § 103 (factors arbiters may consider).

Id. However, to the extent state law sets a benchmark payment standard for out-of-network
rates for fully insured plans, the state benchmark is not preempted and will govern. Id.
7

8
Fuse Brown, supra note 5, at 768– 69 (using median in-network rates “risks ossifying the
current above-market rates resulting from a distorted market”).

No Surprises Act § 103; Benjamin Chartock et al., Arbitration Over Out-of-Network Medical
Bills: Evidence from New Jersey Payment Disputes, 40 Health Affs. 130 (2021) (finding surprise bill
arbitration decisions were 5.7 times the median in-network rate when providers were able to present
evidence of billed charges, increasing cost, and incentivizing inflated charges). Given these results,
the Act’s refusal to allow arbiters to consider the provider’s billed charges is a significant victory.
Contrast Air Ambulance and Patient Billing Advisory Comm.’s Subcomm. on Prevention of
Balance Billing, Report on Prevention of Balance 16 (2021) (recommending arbiters consider
provider’s billed charges).
9

10

No Surprises Act § 103.

Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Medics, Markets, and Medicare, 43 Rutgers Comput. and Tech. L.J.
37, 44 – 45 (2017).
11
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Third, the No Surprises Act does not respond to cost-shifting concerns.
Air ambulance providers charge privately insured and uninsured patients
up to nine and one-half times the reimbursement rate paid by Medicare and
Medicaid patients, significantly more price discrimination than in other areas of
healthcare.12 Providers claim this differential is necessary to offset losses because
government-insured reimbursement rates are too low. The large differential may
actually reflect a total lack of price control. Either way, since privately insured
patients make up only 32% of air ambulance transports, and government-insured
patients make up the majority, the inequitable cost or cost-shifting problem must
be addressed to avoid unfairly burdening privately insured individuals.
The No Surprises Act also creates a new potential problem. It requires insurers
to assume additional liability for out-of-network transports, and therefore, it is
likely to increase health insurance premiums.13 A small premium increase may
be a necessary evil to avoid unfair surprise and illusory insurance. Yet, the Act’s
failure to insist on efficient air ambulance rate and supply and to end cost-shifting
could result in a larger premium increase that actually prices individuals out of
the insurance market altogether.14 Individuals living in rural areas are already
uninsured at higher than average rates, largely due to higher premiums and lower
income. An increase in premiums could unintentionally exacerbate existing
inequities in access to all health care.15
In conclusion, while the No Surprises Act offers immediate balance billing
relief and encourages in-network participation, it leaves significantly more to be
done to address the underlying air ambulance problems that disproportionately
disadvantage rural Americans. A more comprehensive solution that regulates
cost and supply and addresses cost-shifting, or ends Airline Deregulation Act
preemption enabling states to do so, as proposed in Rural Health Inequity and the
Air Ambulance Abyss, remains needed.

12

Ge Bai et al., Air Ambulances with Sky-High Charges, 38 Health Affs. 1195 (2019).

13

No Surprises Act § 102.

See Sarah Kliff, In Biden’s Stimulus Plan, a Provision to Help Millions Get Health Insurance,
N.Y. Times 15 (Jan. 17, 2021) (uninsured Americans report unaffordable health insurance premiums
as the top reason they are uninsured).
14

Cognizant of this potential harm, the No Surprises Act does require HHS and GAO
reports on the impact of the new law on cost and access in rural areas. No Surprises Act § 109.
15
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